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Abstract
Chanson, Ding and Salomaa have recently constructed several classes of authentication codes using certain
classes of functions. In this paper, we further extend that work by constructing two classes of Cartesian authenti-
cation codes using the logarithm functions. The codes constructed here involve the theory of cyclotomy and are
better than a subclass of Helleseth–Johansson’s codes and Bierbrauer’s codes in terms of the maximum success
probability with respect to the substitution attack.
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1. Introduction
Authentication codes were considered in 1974 by Gilbert and Sloane [5]. In the model of authen-
tication theory described by Simmons [11], there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver, and
an opponent. The transmitter wants to send information to the receiver through a public channel which
is subject to active attacks, while the opponent wants to deceive the receiver. Without observing any
message from the transmitter to the receiver, the opponent impersonates the transmitter by sending his
message to the receiver, causing the receiver to accept a fraudulent message as authentic. This is called
the impersonation attack, and we use Pd0 to denote the opponent’s maximum success probability with
respect to this attack. Having observed one message from the transmitter to the receiver, the opponent
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replaces the original message with his own message. This is called the substitution attack, and we use
Pd1 to denote the opponent’s maximum success probability with respect to this attack.
To protect against these attacks, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret key, which is used in
an authentication code. In this model there is only one receiver, and it is the model considered in this
paper. For multireceiver authentication codes, the reader is referred to [4,7,9,10].
A systematic Cartesian authentication code is a code in which the source state (i.e., the plaintext) is
concatenated with an authenticator (also called a tag) to form a message which is sent via a channel.
Such a code is a 5-tuple (S, E,M, T , f ), where S is the set of source states, E is the set of keys,
and T is the set of authenticators, M is the set of all possible messages, and f : S × E → T is the
authentication mapping. Each function f (·, e) is called an encoding rule. When the transmitter wants to
send the information s ∈ S using a key e ∈ E, which is secretly shared with the receiver, he transmits
the message m = (s, t), where t = f (s, e) ∈ T is the tag (authenticator). When the receiver receives the
message m = (s, t), he checks its authenticity by verifying whether t = f (s, e) or not using the secret
key e ∈ E. If the equality holds, the message is regarded as authentic and is accepted. Otherwise the
message is rejected.
Combinatorial designs have been successfully used to construct certain optimal authentication codes
[8,12]. Certain algebraic curves give also very good authentication codes [1,13]. Chanson, Ding and
Salomaa [2] have recently presented two constructions of authentication codes using certain classes
of functions. Some of their codes are optimal. In this paper, using the framework of [2] we construct
authentication codes with logarithm functions. The authentication codes constructed in this paper are
better than a subclass of Helleseth–Johansson’s codes and Bierbrauer’s codes in terms of the success
probability Pd1 with respect to the substitution attack.
2. The first class of Cartesian authentication codes based on logarithm functions
Let F be a mapping from A to B, where (A,+) and (B,+) are finite abelian groups. The first
construction of [2] gives authentication codes
(S, E, T , f ), (1)
where the set of source states is (S,+) = (A,+), the set of keys (E,+) = (A,+), the tag space is
(T ,+) = (B,+), and the authentication mapping f from S × E to T is defined by
f (s, e) = F(s + e), e ∈ A.
It is assumed that there is a probability distribution on both the source state space and the key space.
In this construction, the keys and the source states are equally likely. The message space M = S × T ,
which depends totally on S and T .
As for the code of (1), the two deception probabilities are given in the following theorem [2], whose
proof is included here for completeness.
Theorem 1. Let (S,+) and (T ,+) be finite abelian groups, and let F be a mapping from S to T . Then
for the authentication code (S, E, T , f ) of (1) defined above, we have
Pd0 =max
t ′∈T
∣∣F−1(t ′)∣∣
|S| .
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Pd1 = max
s∈S,t∈F(S)
max
s′ /=s,t ′
∣∣ (F−1(t)− s) ∩ (F−1(t ′)− s′) ∣∣∣∣F−1(t)∣∣ ,
where F(S) is the image of S under the mapping F .
Proof. In an impersonation attack, the opponent wants to generate a new message m′ = (s′, t ′) by
choosing a source state s′ and an e′ ∈ E and computing t ′ = F(s′ + e′). The new message m′ is then
inserted into the channel. This attack is successful if and only if F(s′ + e) = t ′. We now need to compute
the probability Pr(F (s′ + e) = t ′). Note that the keys and source states are equiprobable. We have
Pd0 =max
s′,t ′
|{e ∈ E : t ′ = f (s′, e)}|
|{e ∈ E}|
=max
s′,t ′
∣∣F−1(t ′)− s′∣∣
|E|
=max
t ′∈T
∣∣F−1(t ′)∣∣
v
.
In a substitution attack, the opponent observed a message m = (s, t) and replaces it with another mes-
sage m′ = (s′, t ′), where s /= s′. Since the keys and source states are equiprobable, the probability of
success of the substitution attack is
Pd1 = max
s∈S,t∈F(S)
max
s′ /=s,t ′
|{e ∈ E : t = f (s, e), t ′ = f (s′, e)}|
|{e ∈ E : t = f (s, e)}|
= max
s∈S,t∈F(S)
max
s′ /=s,t ′
∣∣(F−1(t)− s) ∩ (F−1(t ′)− s′)∣∣∣∣F−1(t)∣∣ . 
With the framework above, several classes of authentication codes were constructed by Chanson,
Ding and Salomaa [2]. Their codes were based on several classes of functions. In this paper, we use some
types of logarithm functions to construct a new class of authentication codes. Throughout this paper we
define Zd = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}. It is known that Pd0  Pd1 for all systematic Cartesian authentication
codes [12].
To describe authentication codes based on the logarithm functions, we make use of the theory of
cyclotomy. Let GF(q) be a finite field, and let q − 1 = dl. For a primitive element α of GF(q), define
D
(d,q)
0 = (αd), the multiplicative group generated by αd , and
D
(d,q)
i = αiD(d,q)0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , d − 1.
The D(d,q)i are called cyclotomic classes of order d. The cyclotomic numbers of order d with respect to
GF(q) are defined as
(i, j)d =
∣∣∣(D(d,q)i + 1) ∩D(d,q)j ∣∣∣ .
Clearly, there are at most d2 different cyclotomic numbers of order d [3].
To prove properties of the authentication codes dealt with in the following sections, for each j ∈ Zd
we define
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C
(d,q)
j =
{
D
(d,q)
j if 1  j  d − 1,
D
(d,q)
0 ∪ {0} if j = 0.
(2)
Theorem 2. Let q − 1 = dl, where d  2 and l are positive integers. Set S = GF(q) and T = Zd.
Define F(x) = (logα x) mod d, where logα 0 = 0. Then for the authentication code (S, E, T , f ) of (1),
we have
|S| = q, |E| = q, |T | = d
and
Pd0 =
1
d
+ d − 1
dq
,
d(max(i, j)d)
q − 1 + d Pd1
{
d
max(i,j)d+1
q−1 , if q−1d odd,
d max
(
(0,0)d+2
q+d−1 ,
max(i,j)d+1
q−1
)
, if q−1
d
even.
Proof. By the definition of F(x), we have F−1(0) = D(d,q)0 ∪ {0} and F−1(i) = D(d,q)i for each i ∈
Zd \ {0}. It then follows from Theorem 1 that
Pd0 = max
t ′∈T
∣∣F−1(t ′)∣∣
|S| =
1 + (q − 1)/d
q
= 1
d
+ d − 1
dq
.
To prove the inequalities for Pd1 , we need to determine
∣∣F−1(t)∩(F−1(t ′)+a)∣∣
F−1(t) , where 0 /= a ∈ GF(q). Let
a−1 ∈ D(d,q)i , t /= 0 (mod d) and t ′ /= 0 (mod d). By Lemma 5 in Appendix A, we have
∣∣F−1(0) ∩ (F−1(0)+ a)∣∣
F−1(0)
=
∣∣∣C(d,q)0 ∩ (C(d,q)0 + a)∣∣∣
q−1
d
+ 1
=
d
(
(i, i)d +
∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣)
q + d − 1 ,∣∣F−1(t) ∩ (F−1(0)+ a)∣∣
F−1(t)
=
∣∣∣C(d,q)t ∩ (C(d,q)0 + a)∣∣∣
q−1
d
=
d
(
(i, t + i)d +
∣∣∣D(d,q)t ∩ {a}∣∣∣)
q − 1 ,∣∣F−1(0) ∩ (F−1(t)+ a)∣∣
F−1(0)
=
∣∣∣C(d,q)0 ∩ (C(d,q)t + a)∣∣∣
q−1
d
+ 1
=
d
(
(t + i, i)d +
∣∣∣D(d,q)t ∩ {−a}∣∣∣)
q + d − 1 ,
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∣∣F−1(t) ∩ (F−1(t ′)+ a)∣∣
F−1(t)
=
∣∣∣C(d,q)t ∩ (C(d,q)t ′ + a)
∣∣∣
q−1
d
= d(t
′ + i, t + i)d
q − 1 .
By Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 in Appendix A,
Pd1 = max
s∈S,t∈F(S)
max
s′ /=s,t ′
∣∣(F−1(t)− s) ∩ (F−1(t ′)− s′)∣∣
|F−1(t)|
= max
a /=0,t /=0 (mod d),t ′ /=0 (mod d)


d
(
(i,i)d+
∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩{a,−a}
∣∣∣)
q+d−1 ,
d
(
(i,t+i)d+
∣∣∣D(d,q)t ∩{a}∣∣∣)
q−1 ,
d
(
(t+i,i)d+
∣∣∣D(d,q)t ∩{−a}∣∣∣)
q+d−1 ,
d(t ′+i,t+i)d
q−1


max
{
d
(0, 0)d + 2
q + d − 1 , d
max(i, j)d + 1
q − 1
}
.
If (q − 1)/d is odd, we prove that∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣  1. (3)
If l = (q − 1)/d is even, then −1 = αd(l/2), where α is the primitive element used to define the
cyclotomic classes. Hence −1 ∈ D(d,q)0 . On the other hand, if −1 ∈ D(d,q)0 , then there is a positive
integer k < l such that −1 = αdk . Hence 1 = α2dk and thus 2k ≡ 0 (mod l). It follows that l is even.
Thus −1 ∈ D(d,q)0 if and only if l is even.
Hence if (q − 1)/d is odd, we have
Pd1max
{
d
max(i, j)d + 1
q + d − 1 , d
max(i, j)d + 1
q − 1
}
=dmax(i, j)d + 1
q − 1 .
It is obvious that
d(max(i, j)d)
q − 1 + d  Pd1 .
This completes the proof. 
For the authentication codes of Theorem 2, the success probability of impersonation Pd0 is essentially
1/d when d is small compared to q. The probability of successful substitution Pd1 is bounded below and
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above by the maximum cyclotomic number of order d. In general it is hard to determine the maximum
cyclotomic number of order d for large d.
The codes described in Theorem 2 do contain very good codes, as given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let q = p2s and d = ps − 1. Then the code of Theorem 2 has parameters
|S| = p2s, |E| = p2s, |T | = ps − 1
and
Pd0 =
1
ps − 1 +
ps − 2
p2s(ps − 1) ,
Pd1


3
ps+1 , if p = 2
3
ps+1 , if p odd, and ps + 1 /= 0 (mod 3),
4
ps+2 , if p odd, and ps + 1 = 0 (mod 3).
Proof. To prove this theorem, we first show that (i, j)d  2 for any pair (i, j). To this end, we consider
the number of solutions (u, v) to the equation
αjαdu = 1 + αiαdv, (4)
where 0  i, j  d − 1 and 0  u, v  ps . Define
l = ps + 1, a = αi, b = αj .
Then it follows from (4) that(
1 + aαdv
)ps+1 = bps+1,
which gives
a
(
αdv
)2 + (1 + aps+1 − bps+1)αdv + aps = 0.
Note that the equation
ax2 +
(
1 + aps+1 − bps+1
)
x + aps = 0 (5)
has at most two solutions. Hence (i, j)d  2.
If p = 2, then l = ps + 1 must be odd. It then follows from Theorem 2 that Pd1  3ps+1 .
If ps + 1 /= 0 (mod 3), we claim that (0, 0)d  1. In this case we have (i, j) = (0, 0). So (5)
becomes x2 + x + 1 = 0. If x = αdv /= 1 is a solution of x2 + x + 1 = 0, then v /= 0 and x3 − 1 =
(x − 1)(x2 + x + 1) = 0. Hence x3 = α3dv = 1 and 3 divides l = ps + 1. This is contrary to the as-
sumption that ps + 1 /= 0 (mod 3). Hence in the case ps + 1 /= 0 (mod 3), x2 + x + 1 has at most
one solution x = 1. It then follows again from Theorem 2 that Pd1  3ps+1 .
If ps + 1 = 0 (mod 3), it follows from the fact (i, j)d  2 and Theorem 2 that Pd1  4ps+2 . This
completes the proof. 
The class of codes of Theorem 3 are the best among all the codes described in Theorem 2, because at
least one cyclotomic number of order d must be 2. This is justified by one of the following two formulas
[3]:
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(A) ∑d−1m=0(h,m)d = l − nh, where
nh =


1, h ≡ 0 (mod d), l even
1, l ≡ d/2 (mod d), l odd
0, otherwise.
(B) ∑d−1h=0(h,m)d = l − km, where
km =
{
1, if m ≡ 0 (mod d);
0, otherwise.
2.1. Comparison with Helleseth–Johansson’s codes
We now compare the codes of Theorem 3 with a subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and
Johansson [6]. They constructed a class of codes with parameters
|S| = rm(D−D/p), |E| = rm+n, |T | = rn (6)
and
Pd0 =
1
rn
, (7)
Pd1 =
1
rn
+ D − 1√
rm
,
where r is a power of a prime p, and D  1 is an integer.
For the two codes to be comparable, we need to set m = n = s, r = p > 2, and D = 2. Then the
subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and Johansson have parameters
|S′| = p2s, |E′| = p2s, |T ′| = ps (8)
and
P ′d0 =
1
ps
, (9)
P ′d1 =
1
ps
+ 1√
ps
.
Note that the tag space of the subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and Johansson has one more
element than the codes in Theorem 3. So max{Pd0, Pd1} = Pd1 for the former should be smaller than
that for the latter. However, if ps  4, we have
1 +√ps
ps
− 4
2 + ps =
2 − 3ps +√ps(ps + 2)
ps(ps + 2) > 0.
Hence from Table 1 the codes of Theorem 3 are better than the subclass of codes constructed by
Helleseth and Johansson. Note that while the parameters of Helleseth–Johansson’s codes are more flex-
ible, the two code construction schemes are comparable only when the above mentioned conditions are
satisfied.
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Table 1
Comparison of a subclass of Helleseth–Johansson’s codes with those in Theorem 3
Parameters S E T max{Pd0 , Pd1} = Pd1
Subclass of HJ’s codes p2s p2s ps 1+
√
ps
ps
Codes in Theorem 3 p2s p2s ps − 1 42+ps
3. The second class of authentication codes based on the logarithm function
Let F be a mapping from A to B, where (A,+) and (B,+) are finite abelian groups. The second
construction of [2] gives authentication codes
(S, E, T , f ), (10)
where the set of source states is (S,+) = (A,+), the set of keys (E,+) = (A× B,+), the tag space is
(T ,+) = (B,+), and the authentication mapping f from S × E to T is defined by
f (s, (ea, eb)) = F(s + ea)+ eb, (ea, eb) ∈ A× B.
In this construction, all keys and all state sources are equally likely. Hence, the number of keys
(encoding rules) is equal to the number of messages, while in the first construction given in Section 2
the number of keys (encoding rules) is much smaller.
This construction of systematic authentication codes is quite general. The key task is to search for
functions that give good authentication codes within the framework of this construction. In this section,
we use some logarithm functions to construct another class of authentication codes.
Theorem 4. Let q − 1 = dl, where d and l are positive integers and q is a power of an odd prime.
Set S = GF(q) and T = Zd. Define F(x) = (logα x) mod d, where logα 0 = 0. Then for the code
(S, E, T , f ) of (10), we have
|S| = q, |E| = qd, |T | = d
and
Pd0 =
1
d
,
Pd1 =


1
d
+ 2d−1
qd
l even and d even
or l odd and d ≡ 0 (mod 4),
1
d
+ d−1
qd
otherwise.
Proof. By Theorem 1,
Pd0 = max
s∈S,t∈f (S,E)
|{e ∈ E | t = f (s, e)}|
|{e ∈ E}|
= max
s∈S,t∈f (S,E)
|{(ea, eb) | t = F(s + ea)+ eb}|
|A||B|
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= |A||A||B|
= 1
d
.
Pd1 = max
s∈S,t∈f (S,E)
max
s′ /=s,t ′∈f (S,E)
|{e ∈ E | t = f (s, e), t ′ = f (s′, e)}|
|{e ∈ E | t = f (s, e)}|
= max
s∈S,t∈f (S,E)
max
s′ /=s,t ′∈f (S,E)
|{(ea, eb) | t = F(s + ea)+ eb, t ′ = F(s′ + ea)+ eb}|
|A|
=
maxs∈S,t∈f (S,E) maxs′ /=s,t ′∈f (S,E)
[∑
eb∈Zd
∣∣∣(C(d,q)t−eb − s) ∩ (C(d,q)t ′−eb − s′
)∣∣∣]
q
= max
a /=0,b

∑
b′∈Zd
∣∣∣(C(d,q)b′ + a) ∩ C(d,q)b+b′
∣∣∣

 /q,
where a = s′ − s /= 0, a−1 ∈ D(2,q)i , b′ = t − eb and b = t ′ − t .
Case 1: b mod d = 0, by Lemmas 5 and 7,
Pd1 =max
a /=0

∣∣∣(C(d,q)0 + a) ∩ C(d,q)0 ∣∣∣+ ∑
b′∈Zd\{0}
∣∣∣(C(d,q)b′ + a) ∩ C(d,q)b′
∣∣∣

 /q
=max
a /=0

(i, i)d + ∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣+ ∑
b′∈Zd\{0}
(i + b′, i + b′)d

 /q
=max
a /=0

∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣+ ∑
b′∈Zd
(i + b′, i + b′)d

 /q
=max
a /=0

∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣+ ∑
b′∈Zd
(b′, b′)d

 /q
=max
a /=0
[∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣+ l − 1] /q
=
{
l+1
q
for dl2 (mod d) = 0,
l
q
otherwise.
Case 2: b mod d /= 0, by Lemmas 5 and 7 in the Appendix A,
Pd1 = max
a /=0,b
[ ∣∣∣(C(d,q)0 + a) ∩ C(d,q)b ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣(C(d,q)−b + a) ∩ C(d,q)0 ∣∣∣
+
∑
b′∈Zd\{0,−b}
∣∣∣(C(d,q)b′ + a) ∩ C(d,q)b+b′
∣∣∣ ]/q
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= max
a /=0,b
[
(i, i + b)d +
∣∣∣D(d,q)b ∩ {a}∣∣∣+ (i − b, i)d + ∣∣∣D(d,q)−b ∩ {−a}∣∣∣
+
∑
b′∈Zd\{0,−b}
(i + b′, i + b + b′)d
]
/q
= max
a /=0,b

∣∣∣D(d,q)b ∩ {a}∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣D(d,q)−b ∩ {−a}∣∣∣+ ∑
b′∈Zd
(i + b′, i + b + b′)d

 /q
= max
a /=0,b

∣∣∣D(d,q)b ∩ {a}∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣D(d,q)−b ∩ {−a}∣∣∣+ ∑
b′∈Zd
(b′, b + b′)d

 /q
= max
a /=0,b
[∣∣∣D(d,q)b ∩ {a}∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣D(d,q)−b ∩ {−a}∣∣∣+ l] /q.
To maximize |D(d,q)b ∩ {a}| + |D(d,q)−b ∩ {−a}|, without loss of generality, assume a ∈ D(d,q)b . −1 ∈
D
(d,q)
q−1
2
and so −a ∈ D(d,q)
b+ q−12
. For −a ∈ D(d,q)−b , we consider the equation
−b ≡ b + q − 1
2
(mod d)
which is equivalent to
2b ≡ dl
2
(mod d).
We now check whether this equation has a solution.
Case 1: l even and d even. In this case b = d/2 is a solution.
Case 2: l even and d odd. In this case there is no solution.
Case 3: l odd and d ≡ 0 mod 4 . In this case b = d/4 is a solution.
Case 4: l odd and d ≡ 2 mod 4 . In this case there is no solution.
Note that q − 1 = dl, and the two cases d odd and l odd cannot happen at the same time. Thus
Pd1 =


l+2
q
l even and d even
or l odd and d ≡ 0 (mod 4),
l+1
q
otherwise.
All the values of Pd1 in Case 2 are greater than or equal to the values of Pd1 in Case 1. By substituting
q = dl + 1, the theorem is proved. 
3.1. Comparison with another class of codes described in [6]
There are authentication codes with parameters [6]
|S| = rm, |E| = rm+n = |S||T |, T = rn (11)
and
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Pd0 = Pd1 =
1
rn
.
These codes are usually constructed by using linear functions in a natural way. For these codes we
have gcd(|S|, |T |) = rmin(m,n) /= 1. However, for the codes of Theorem 4 we have
gcd(|S|, |T |) = 1, (12)
and the corresponding Pd1 is slightly bigger than 1|T | . Under the condition of (12), it may be proved that
no code with Pd0 = Pd1 = 1rn exists, because orthogonal arrays with corresponding parameters may not
exist. Hence the parameters of (11) are of different types compared with those in Theorem 4. On the
other hand, the code construction in Theorem 4 uses the logarithm function.
3.2. Comparison with Bierbrauer’s codes
We now compare the codes of Theorem 4 with Bierbrauer’s codes [1]. Bierbrauer employed the com-
position method to geometry codes and obtained an authentication code with the following parameters:
|S| = rs(1+rs−t ), |E| = r2s+t , |T | = rt (13)
and
Pd0 =
1
rt
, Pd1 =
2
rt
, (14)
where r is a power of a prime p, and s  t are natural numbers.
In order for the codes to be comparable to the codes of Theorem 4 we set s = t . Then (13) and (14)
become
|S| = q2t , |E| = q3t , |T | = qt (15)
and
Pd0 =
1
qt
= 1|T | ,
Pd1 =
2
qt
= 1|T | +
1√|S| . (16)
In this case we have |E| = |S||T |.
For the code of Theorem 4, we have also |E| = |S||T | and Pd0 = 1|T | . But the success probability of
the substitution attack on the code of Theorem 4 is
Pd1 
l + 2
q
<
1
d
+ 2
q
= 1|T | +
1
|S|/2 .
Thus in the case that |S| > 2|T |, the code of Theorem 4 is better than the subclass of codes of [1]
in the special case s = t . Note that the codes of Theorem 4 are comparable with only this subclass of
Bierbrauer’s codes due to restrictions on the code parameters.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper within the framework of Chanson, Ding and Salomaa [2], we presented two classes of
systematic authentication codes using the theory of cyclotomy and the logarithm function. In all the
cases that the codes are comparable, our codes are better than Helleseth–Johansson’s codes and also
Bierbrauer’s codes. With the known relations between universal hash families and authentication codes
[13,14], the authentication codes described in this paper may be used to construct universal hash families.
The parameters of the authentication codes described in Theorem 2 are flexible in that d could be any
proper divisor of q − 1. However, d must be chosen carefully in order to get good authentication codes.
For example, if q = p2s and d = ps + 1, the code is bad in the sense that Pd1 is quite large. Thus the
codes of Theorem 2 contain both good and bad codes.
A class of very good authentication codes based on algebraic curves were constructed by Xing, Wang
and Lam [13]. Unfortunately the codes described in this paper cannot be compared with the Xing–Wang–
Lam codes because their parameters are not comparable.
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Appendix A. Several auxiliary results
Recall that q − 1 = dl and that D(d,q)i are the cyclotomic classes of order d. Also recall the definition
of C(d,q)i in (2). The following lemma is useful in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5. Let a /= 0, where a−1 ∈ D(d,q)i , t /= 0 (mod d) and t ′ /= 0 (mod d). Then∣∣∣(C(d,q)0 + a) ∩ C(d,q)0 ∣∣∣=(i, i)d + ∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣(C(d,q)0 + a) ∩ C(d,q)t ∣∣∣=(i, i + t)d + ∣∣∣D(d,q)t ∩ {a}∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣(C(d,q)t + a) ∩ C(d,q)0 ∣∣∣=(i + t, i)d + ∣∣∣D(d,q)t ∩ {−a}∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣(C(d,q)t + a) ∩ C(d,q)t ′
∣∣∣=(i + t, i + t ′)d .
Proof.∣∣∣(C(d,q)0 + a) ∩ C(d,q)0 ∣∣∣=∣∣∣(D(d,q)0 ∪ {0} + a) ∩ (D(d,q)0 ∪ {0})∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(D(d,q)0 + a) ∩D(d,q)0 ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(a−1D(d,q)0 + 1) ∩ a−1D(d,q)0 ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣
=(i, i)d +
∣∣∣D(d,q)0 ∩ {a,−a}∣∣∣ .
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The remaining parts are proved similarly. 
The Gaussian periods ηi of order d, i = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1, are defined as follows:
ηi =
∑
c∈D(d,q)i
ξ c,
where ξ is a complex qth root of unity.
The following results are well known, but we include a proof for the sake of completeness. To simplify
the notations, we use (i, j) to denote (i, j)d , which is the cyclotomic number of order d.
Lemma 6. For cyclotomic numbers and Gaussian periods of order d, we have the following:
(A)
∑d−1
i=0 ηi = −1.
(B) ηiηi+k =∑d−1h=0(k, h)ηi+h + lθk, where
θk =
{
1 if l is even and k = 0, or l is odd and k = d/2,
0 otherwise.
(C)
∑d−1
h=0(k, h) = l − θk.
(D) q(k, h) =
{
l2 +∑d−1i=0 ηiηi+kηi+h if l is even,
l2 +∑d−1i=0 ηiηi+kηi+h+d/2 if l is odd.
Proof. (A) By definition,
d−1∑
i=0
ηi =
d−1∑
i=0
∑
c∈D(d,q)i
ξ c =
∑
c∈Z∗q
ξ c = −1
(B) By definition,
ηiηi+k=
∑
c∈D(d,q)i
∑
u∈D(d,q)i+k
ωc+u
=
∑
c∈D(d,q)i
∑
u∈D(d,q)i+k
ωc[1+uc−1]
=
d−1∑
h=0
(k, h)ηi+h + lθk,
where θk is 1 if −1 ∈ D(d,q)k and 0 otherwise, implying the condition on θk as defined above.
(C) The expression ∑d−1h=0(k, h) equals the number of times an element in D(d,q)k is followed by an
element in some D(d,q)h . Since D
(d,q)
k contains l elements and the only element not in any D
(d,q)
h is 0, it
follows that the sum equals l except when −1 is in D(d,q)k , in which case the sum equals l − 1.
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(D) Let h∗ = h if l is even and h∗ = h+ d/2 if l is odd. Then, from (A), (B) and (C), we obtain
d−1∑
i=0
ηiηi+kηi+h∗ =
d−1∑
i=0
(
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)ηi+a + lθk
)
ηi+h∗
=
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)
d−1∑
i=0
ηi+aηi+h∗ − lθk
=
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)
d−1∑
u=0
ηuηu+h∗−a − lθk
=
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)
d−1∑
u=0
(
d−1∑
b=0
(h∗ − a, b)ηu+b + lθh∗−a
)
− lθk
=
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)
(
d−1∑
b=0
(h∗ − a, b)(−1)+ dlθh∗−a
)
− lθk
=
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a) ((l − θh∗−a)(−1)+ dlθh∗−a)− lθk
=
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)((dl + 1)θh∗−a − l)− lθk
=q
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)θh∗−a − (l − θk)l − lθk
=−l2 + q
d−1∑
a=0
(k, a)θh∗−a
=−l2 + q(k, h)
which completes the proof. 
The next lemma gives a very nice and perhaps surprising formula for the summations
∑d−1
u=0(u, u+
k), which turn out to be independent of the individual cyclotomic numbers. It plays an important role in
proving Theorem 4.
Lemma 7. Let q − 1 = dl and let q be an odd prime. Then
d−1∑
u=0
(u, u+ k) =
{
l − 1 if k = 0,
l if k /= 0.
Proof. Let k∗ = k if l is even and k∗ = k + d/2 if l is odd. By definition, and the previous lemmas, it
follows that:
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q
d−1∑
u=0
(u, u+ k)= l2d +
d−1∑
u=0
d−1∑
i=0
ηiηi+uηi+u+k∗
=(q − 1)l +
d−1∑
i=0
ηi
d−1∑
u=0
ηi+uηi+u+k∗
=(q − 1)l +
d−1∑
i=0
ηi
d−1∑
t=0
ηtηt+k∗
=(q − 1)l +
d−1∑
i=0
ηi
d−1∑
t=0
(
d−1∑
h=0
(k∗, h)ηt+h + lθk∗
)
=(q − 1)l +
d−1∑
i=0
ηi
d−1∑
h=0
(k∗, h)
d−1∑
t=0
ηt+h − dlθk∗
=(q − 1)l + (−1)
d−1∑
h=0
(k∗, h)(−1)− (q − 1)θk∗
=(q − 1)l + (l − θk∗)− (q − 1)θk∗
=q(l − θk∗).
Dividing both sides by q and using the definition of θk∗ prove this lemma. 
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